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Abstract
Feedback can help individuals put their performance into perspective, especially when
transitioning into a new environment such as university or a different job. In a random-
ized field experiment we give first-year university students normatively framed relative
performance feedback about their accumulated course credits. We find an increase in
subsequent performance, but only when the feedback is positive. Using a regression
discontinuity design, we show that the improved performance is not driven by unob-
served characteristics of those receiving positive feedback, but that it is indeed due to
the positive rather than negative nature of the feedback. We administer a replication
experiment with the next wave of first-year students one year later and reproduce the
results. Survey data provides suggestive evidence that positive feedback has an effect
on behavior when students underestimate their relative performance, and that consis-
tent with a mechanism of selective information processing, individuals focus on positive
feedback to adjust their beliefs.
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21 Introduction
Whenever individuals enter new environments, such as university or a different job, feed-
back can help them appraise their performance. Absolute feedback, however, is often insuffi-
cient to put performance into perspective, because objective benchmarks have not yet been
established or are unknown to the individuals, leaving them with no appropriate frame of
reference. The resulting uncertainty may compromise motivation, or lead to misguided and
non-optimal decision-making, for example when it comes to effort provision. Under such
conditions, social comparison theory suggests that information about the behavior of simi-
lar others can provide an important benchmark or reference point against which individuals
can compare their performance and gauge their abilities (Bandura 1991, Corcoran, Crusius
and Mussweiler 2011, Festinger 1954, and Taylor, Wayment and Carrillo 1996). Offering per-
formance feedback relative to a suitable peer group may therefore enhance decision-making
and motivation, and therefore facilitate an efficient transition into the new environment.
The performance feedback literature largely relies on providing relative feedback in terms
of objective information like rank or percentile in the performance distribution.1 A comple-
mentary approach is frequently employed in the social norms literature, but has not been
explored when it comes to performance feedback:2 the provision of normative feedback.3
Normative frames or injunctive messages can provide cues which make individuals aware
of reference points and especially of what type of behavior is approved in a new environ-
ment (see e.g., Allcott 2011, Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990, Deutsch and Gerard 1955, and
Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius 2007). We combine objective relative
performance information with normative frames to clearly convey what constitutes positive
and negative feedback, respectively. There is some theoretical reason to believe that positive
and negative feedback have diverging effects on performance, by differentially affecting mo-
tivation or because negative information may be discounted (see Bénabou and Tirole 2016
or Golman, Hagmann and Loewenstein 2017). Augmenting objective relative performance
feedback with normative messages allows us to separately investigate the effects of these
1Examples for the provision of rankings or distributional information range from workplace settings (e.g.,
Azmat and Iriberri 2016, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011, Card, Mas, Moretti and Saez 2012, Gibbons and Murphy
1990, or Gill, Kissová, Lee and Prowse 2018) to educational environments (e.g., Azmat and Iriberri 2010, Azmat,
Bagues, Cabrales and Iriberri 2018, and Goulas and Megalokonomou 2015) and have shown mixed effects on
performance and other outcomes.
2Where we take performance to broadly encompass accomplishments at the workplace, in school or at other
productive tasks.
3Normative frames are popular in social comparison contexts that are not concerned with performance.
They have been applied to foster e.g. tax compliance (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe and Vlaev 2017, Slemrod 2016)
or environmentally-friendly behavior (see e.g., Allcott and Rogers 2014, Costa and Kahn 2013, and Goldstein,
Cialdini and Griskevicius 2008).
3different types of feedback.
Feedback is presumably especially important when the new tasks are complex and chal-
lenging, and the stakes are high. An economically and socially important area to which this
applies is higher education. Individuals at the start of their academic career may lack infor-
mation on how difficult it will be to succeed in complex tasks like passing university exams
and how much effort they should expend.4 Additionally, the stakes are relatively large. Fail-
ing exams always comes with a substantial cost in terms of re-taking classes and psychologi-
cal pressures, but at the beginning of study programs this is often exacerbated by certain core
exams being prerequisites to continue on with the program. This makes higher education an
interesting and relevant setting to test the effectiveness of normatively framed performance
feedback.
We conduct a randomized field experiment with a cohort of first-year students at a Ger-
man university of applied sciences, and combine relative performance feedback on obtained
course credits with normative cues. After the first semester exams, control group students
receive letters in the mail informing them about how many credits they obtained in the pre-
vious semester. Students in the treatment group receive the same information but the letters
also inform them about how well they performed relative to the average student and the stu-
dent on the 80th percentile.5 This information is augmented with normative messages of
approval for those who obtained at least the average amount of credits. For those below
the average the approving normative messages are greyed out. These individuals therefore
receive no explicitly disapproving normative framing, but should be aware that their per-
formance failed to qualify for an approving message. This design allows us to provide first
evidence on the effects of performance feedback by type of feedback. We label the different
types of feedback as follows: positive (= above average performance + approving normative
message), ambiguous (= average performance + approving normative message) and negative
(= below average performance + no approving normative message).
We provide feedback on obtained course credits. The choice of credits over grades as the
feedback dimension is driven by two important considerations. First, for students at the start
of their university careers it is likely harder to assess their abilities with respect to how many
exams they can take than to assess their ability to obtain good grades (Figure 16 provides
4Among other causes, this may contribute to a large share of students in higher education never obtaining a
degree or taking much longer than scheduled to graduate. In the U.S., less than 40% of a cohort entering four-
year institutions obtain a bachelor’s degree within four years (See the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES), Jan 19 2017, retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ d13/tables/dt13_326.10.asp). The
U.S. is no exception. In many countries delayed graduation is prevalent, and about 30% of students entering a
four-year tertiary education in the OECD do not complete their studies (OECD 2013).
5In the first experiment “average student” refers to the median student, in the second experiment to the
mean performance of the other students.
4some evidence on this). This is because in contrast to university, high school typically leaves
little freedom to vary the amount of exams taken and so students have no experience in this
domain. Such situations where individuals lack experience and therefore information are
exactly where feedback can be most helpful. Second, obtained credits are an interesting out-
come from a policy perspective, as they are not only a measure for academic performance,
but ultimately determine time to graduation. Lower time to graduation has substantial pay-
offs: on an individual level people forgo income with each semester taken longer to grad-
uate, and from a social perspective faster graduation means higher contributions in terms
of taxes and payments into the social security systems.6 It is thus not surprising that time
to graduation has started to receive more attention in recent years, possibly triggered by the
observation that in many countries students take much longer than scheduled to obtain a
degree (e.g., Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2012, Garibaldi, Giavazzi, Ichino and Rettore
2012, Himmler, Jäckle and Weinschenk (forthcoming), and Leuven, Oosterbeek and Klaauw
2010).
Another important feature of our experiment is that we observe the entire universe of
performance, i.e. the results of all exams taken. We thus measure the treatment effect of
feedback on overall exam performance and not in a single course (in which case one may
find effects simply due to students re-allocating effort between courses). Any positive effects
can thus be interpreted as net gains. We give feedback on performance in terms of passing
exams (obtained course credits), and expect to find effects in that domain. Yet an important
but often neglected question is whether such gains can be had without sacrificing on another
dimension. We thus also monitor student grades and dropout behavior, and we consider
survey responses on measures of well-being such as life satisfaction and satisfaction with
the study program. This allows us to paint a more encompassing picture of the effects of
performance feedback on participants’ welfare.
We find that in the second semester (i.e. the first treatment semester), students who re-
ceive positive feedback earn about 2.1 credit points (.2 standard deviations) more than the
controls. With a regression discontinuity design we make use of the sharp cut-off for posi-
tive feedback, and show that the treatment effect is indeed due to the positive feedback, and
not due to unobserved characteristics of those receiving positive feedback. Negative feed-
back has no statistically significant effect on behavior. Neither does ambiguous feedback.
The latter suggests that sending a normative message of approval has no effect without the
fundamentals to back it up, i.e. without evidence of above average performance. Finally,
we show that students who receive positive feedback maintain the same grade point aver-
6In many ways, the benefits of obtaining credits are therefore quite straightforward and possibly easier to
quantify than the benefits of obtaining better grades.
5age as the controls, indicating that they do not buy gains on one performance dimension
with losses on another. Similarly, we find no evidence of students being worse off on the
well-being domains we observe.
We administer a replication experiment one year later with the new cohort of first-year
students. The design is identical with one small tweak. Because we found effects of positive
feedback, we now report the mean instead of the median for the average performance in the
feedback letters. Since the performance of many students in the first experiment was ex-
actly equal to the median and because the mean is smaller than the median in our data, this
enables us to give positive feedback to a larger share of the treatment group (56% vs 37.5%
in the original experiment). We reproduce all findings of the original experiment. Most im-
portantly, we validate the result that positive feedback significantly increases performance
(although the effects are somewhat smaller: 1.7 credit points or .16 standard deviations).
This is particularly interesting, because it implies that through the simple design tweak, we
can extend the positive effects to also benefit weaker students (who obtain median or slightly
below median credits).
In both the original experiment and the replication we find no further performance gain
of the treatment groups versus the controls in the third semester. In order to better under-
stand these dynamics and the differential effects of feedback types, in the replication ex-
periment we gather survey data on the pre- and post-treatment expectations about relative
performance. In particular, we investigate two questions: first, do effects depend on whether
the feedback provides new or unexpected information, and, second, are the results driven by
the different feedback types being asymmetrically processed? We find suggestive evidence
that positive feedback is effective when students underestimate their relative performance
pre-treatment. Further, a post-treatment survey in the second semester shows that students
update their expectations in response to positive relative feedback, and that the expectations
of these students are significantly more accurate than the expectations of the controls qual-
ifying for positive feedback. At the same time, we see no evidence of updated expectations
in response to negative feedback, suggesting that students possibly ignore or disregard such
information (although the sample size here is very small and the confidence intervals wide).
Finally, in the third semester, the expectations of the controls who would have qualified for
positive feedback are almost as accurate as the expectations in the treatment group. This
indicates that after a while there is no longer an informational difference between treatment
and control group, in line with no further effects of positive feedback in the third semester.
In contrast, with negative feedback, neither control nor treatment group improve the accu-
racy of their expectations in the third semester – which again suggests that students do not
process negative information.
The results are broadly consistent with the idea that a positive view of one’s ability is a sig-
6nificant motivational and potentially performance enhancing factor (see Bénabou and Tirole
2002). Individuals may therefore maintain a positive self-assessment by selectively process-
ing positive feedback while discarding negative feedback.7 This idea is also expressed in Eil
and Rao (2011): individuals who receive negative feedback have little willingness do update
their self-concept, whereas people who receive positive information are willing to incorpo-
rate the positive news in their future behavior. The finding that positive feedback increases
performance is also in line with the models of Ertac (2005) as well as Azmat and Iriberri
(2010), who argue that individuals use feedback to update self-perceived ability. Similarly, in
the presence of selective information processing, competitive preferences and social norms
theory can be aligned with our findings.
Overall, our results show that identifying information deficiencies and providing norma-
tively framed feedback can help individuals who underestimate their abilities. This strategy
is not only effective but also inexpensive. The total cost of our measure per semester and
student is less than e 2.5 (see Table 3). In education contexts, this compares very favorably
to more traditional measures of improving outcomes, such as hiring new faculty in order to
reduce class size or grant schemes.8
Relation to the Literature Our findings contribute to the literature on several dimensions.
First, we add to the relative performance feedback literature in general. Most of the research
in this area is concerned with effects on the performance of employees, and is implemented
in the lab or workplace contexts. In lab experiments the subjects are typically asked to com-
plete real-effort tasks such as decoding, adding, or multiplying numbers and are given feed-
back on their performance (Azmat and Iriberri 2016, Charness, Masclet and Villeval 2013,
Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval 2009, and Kuhnen and Tymula 2012). When it comes to field
evidence, the tasks include dispatching goods, picking fruits, and selling clothing or furni-
ture (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 2013, Barankay 2012, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011,
and Delfgaauw, Dur, Sol and Verbeke 2013). The tasks in those studies usually are repeatedly
performed over a longer period of time, and the relative performance feedback is introduced
7A strand of the psychological literature has argued that individuals increase their efforts only after receiving
positive feedback, and underweight adverse information about themselves (Ilgen, Fisher and Taylor 1979, Ilgen
and Davis 2000, and Pearce and Porter 1986). In economics the reasoning is similar: Bénabou and Tirole (2002)
argue that individuals choose to selectively remember positive information in order to maintain a positive self-
image, whereas in Compte and Postlewaite (2004) individuals put little weight on negative information because
they attribute negative outcomes to e.g. bad luck, as opposed to positive outcomes, which are attributed to own
abilities or efforts.
8For example, the US Pell Grant initiative pays individual students up to $5,815 per annum (2016-17
award year). It aims at keeping students on track by rewarding “accelerated completion” and paying an
“On-Track Pell Bonus”; see US Department of Education, http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/
fact-sheet-helping-more-americans-complete-college-new-proposals-success, retrieved on Jan
19 2017.
7at a time when workers are familiar with the task (Barankay 2012, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol
2011, or Delfgaauw, Dur, Sol and Verbeke 2013). We complement this literature by investigat-
ing the effects of relative performance feedback in a new environment, where the stakes are
relatively high, the task is rather complex, and individuals have little intuition about the un-
derlying performance distribution. Furthermore, the performance feedback literature has
focused on providing feedback in the form of rankings or distributional information. Our
approach of combining this type of information with normative messages is novel in the
performance feedback literature. It clearly communicates to the subjects what constitutes
(un-)desirable performance and what therefore should be perceived as positive and negative
feedback – allowing us to separately analyze the effects of these different feedback types.
More specifically, our results contribute to the scarce literature about relative perfor-
mance feedback in higher education, which so far provides mixed results.9 There are two
studies which find that relative feedback on the performance in a practice test or midterm
exam improves the outcome of the final exam (Kajitani, Morimoto and Suzuki 2017 and
Tran and Zeckhauser 2012). However, two other studies that provide students with infor-
mation about their rank in the GPA distribution find zero or negative effects (Azmat, Bagues,
Cabrales and Iriberri 2018 and Cabrera and Cid 2017). Our study adds a number of aspects
to this literature. First, we provide evidence that feedback type (positive or negative) matters
and that positive relative performance feedback increases subsequent performance. Repli-
cating the original experiment with a later cohort of students shows that this is a robust find-
ing. Second, we are the first to provide relative performance feedback on obtained credits in-
stead of GPA; a domain where it is likely hard for students to assess their own ability (as they
just entered university), and where it is also likely that they have only little prior knowledge
about the performance distribution of others students. Third, by also considering effects on
grades we can make sure that the positive effects are not accompanied by students trading
off credits and grades. Finally, by observing the entire universe of performance we can check
that any effects are indeed net gains, and are not generated by sacrificing performance in
other courses (which could be a concern when only observing outcomes in one course).
Furthermore, the results of our study are related to the literature that studies the relation
between confidence and performance. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) develop a model in which
higher confidence in their abilities motivates individuals to work harder and take benefi-
cial risks. Consequently, individuals may engage in confidence enhancing and/or preserv-
ing behavior, e.g. in asymmetric updating of beliefs in the face of good or bad news. Both
aspects have been studied empirically. Individuals with higher levels of confidence have
9There is also a literature on the effects of relative performance feedback in primary and secondary educa-
tion that mainly finds positive effects (Azmat and Iriberri 2010, Fischer and Wagner 2017, Goulas and Mega-
lokonomou 2015, and Katreniakova 2014).
8been found to work harder (Puri and Robinson 2007), even in tasks that are unrelated to the
source of confidence (Pikulina, Luc and Philippe 2018). Also, individuals do indeed engage
in asymmetric updating, depending on whether news are good or bad (Eil and Rao 2011,
and Möbius, Niederle, Niehaus and Rosenblat 2014). Our findings are consistent with both
aspects. First, we see an increase in performance in response to positive feedback. Second,
we observe that individuals correctly revise their beliefs about their expected relative perfor-
mance in the face of positive feedback, while there is no evidence they do so when presented
with negative feedback. Our field experiments therefore add to the existing literature on the
asymmetric updating of beliefs, especially the very scarce evidence from the field. Taken to-
gether, the results are in line with the notion that enhanced confidence constitutes the link
between positive feedback and increases in performance.
Finally, we contribute to the literature that applies informational nudges in public pol-
icy, where the provision of information has been shown to e.g. influence medical choices,
advance environmentally friendly behavior, tax compliance, and social benefit take-up (for
an overview see e.g., Madrian 2014 or Chetty 2015). In particular, our intervention adds to
the strand of research which aims to improve outcomes in higher education by providing
information.10 For example, Hoxby and Turner (2013) find that high-achieving, low-income
students attend more selective colleges, when they are given information about the applica-
tion process and the net cost of colleges. Castleman and Page (2015, 2016) use personalized
text messages to increase the number of individuals that enrol in college among low-income
high school graduates, and to increase college persistence, respectively. Wiswall and Zafar
(2015a, 2015b) find that students revise their beliefs about expected earnings in response
to information about the true population distribution of earnings. The revised beliefs then
influence the college major choice of students. Our study shows that the provision of (nor-
matively framed) information can be an effective means of targeting performance directly.
This complements studies that e.g. try to directly influence student performance via finan-
cial incentives (e.g., De Paola, Scoppa and Nisticò 2012 and Leuven, Oosterbeek and Klaauw
2010), by providing a low cost and easily scalable alternative.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institu-
tional background, data, and design of our two experiments. We discuss different theoret-
ical frameworks in Section 3. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
10Damgaard and Nielsen (2018) review the current research on (informational) nudging in education.
92 Institutional Background and Research Design
Our field experiments take place at one of the largest universities of applied sciences in Ger-
many, with twelve faculties and more than 13,000 students. All students in our experiments
are enrolled in bachelor’s degree programs at the largest and third-largest faculties of the
university: Business Administration and Mechanical Engineering.
2.1 Institutional Background
In order to obtain their degree, students need to acquire a total of 210 credits (ECTS), and
the scheduled study duration is seven semesters, i.e. on average they are supposed to obtain
30 credits per semester.11 The study programs follow a modular structure, where credits
are awarded for passed exams. For many, these exams are challenging and complex tasks,
especially at the beginning of an academic career. Arguably, they also have a high stakes
nature for several reasons. First, passing obviously determines whether or not the student
obtains the credits needed to graduate. Second, passing more exams per semester reduces
the time to graduation, which typically translates into earlier entry into the workforce and
higher lifetime income.12 Third, students have to pass certain exams early in their studies in
order to be allowed to continue with the program.13 Fourth, the cost of not passing can be
substantial, both in terms of time as well as psychologically: Students will have to study for
the exams again, and potentially have to attend the same classes again in the next semester.
On top, failing exams may incur psychological distress.14
Students can at all times access information on their progress via a web portal main-
tained by the university. The portal provides data on absolute performance – credits and
GPA. It is important to note, however, that in absence of our treatment, the university does
not provide any information or feedback on a student’s relative performance.
2.2 Field Experiment I
The original field experiment is conducted with a cohort of first-year students who just started
in their bachelor’s programs. Treatment commences as soon as information on previous per-
formance is available, i.e. at the start of the second semester. At this point 812 students study
11The European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) is the Europe-wide standardized point
system which allows students to transfer their credit points from one European university to another.
12However, since these benefits materialize far in the future, they may not be very salient to students.
13For example, the programs typically include an internship semester and students are not allowed to start
the practical part of their education before they have earned at least 60 credit points.
14See, e.g. Brunstein and Gollwitzer (1996) for a discussion of the (psychological) effects of failure.
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towards degrees in five bachelor programs at the faculties for Business Administration and
Mechanical Engineering. Roughly 80% of these students are enrolled in two large programs:
Business Administration and Mechanical Engineering (Table 2 provides an overview of all
degree programs and the number of students in our intervention).
Randomization. Randomization was carried out after the first semester, using stratifica-
tion and balancing (see Morgan and Rubin 2012). We applied information on study pro-
grams and obtained accumulated first-semester credits (ACP) to divide students into sepa-
rate strata and balanced on age, sex, high school grade, time since high school graduation,
pre-treatment grade point average and type of high school degree (only Experiment II).15
The rightmost columns of Table 2 display the fraction of students in treatment and control,
by degree program. Tables 4 and 5 show the balancing properties across the control and
treatment groups for the full sample and the subsample of students that were eligible to re-
ceive positive feedback.
Feedback Letter I. In the week before the second semester lectures start (see Figure 1),
students in the control and treatment group receive an unannounced letter in the mail, pro-
viding them with information on their accumulated credits (ACP) and their cumulative GPA
(AGPA). The envelope bears the official seal of the university, in order to ensure that students
will open and read the letter. To further stress the official character, the letters are signed by
the dean of the respective faculty. In the few cases where letters came back as undeliverable,
we re-sent them via email (N= 32).
In both groups the letter states that the faculty "[...] would like to assist you in the further
organization and planning of your studies. To this end we provide you with feedback infor-
mation about your current academic performance" (see Figures 3 and 4). The control group
letter then lists the student’s credits and GPA obtained in the first semester – with no com-
parison to fellow students. In contrast, the treatment group letter continues with a graphical
illustration that provides relative performance feedback on accumulated credit points. The
visualization of this social comparison feedback information is shown in Figures 2 and 3, and
we explain the design in detail below. Finally, as in the control group, the letter also quotes
the student’s cumulative first semester GPA (with no relative comparison).
Feedback Letter II. About four to five weeks before the exam period, students of the control
and treatment group receive a second feedback letter (see Figure 1 and Figures 5 and 6). The
letter design is identical to the first letter, and for most students the contained information
15In Experiment I rerandomization was only conducted in the largest Bachelor’s program (BA). See the Data
and Methods Appendix for more details on our randomization procedure.
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will also be identical to the first letter. In some cases the university updated the information
on grades and credits (e.g., because course results were not yet available), which can lead
to different feedback compared to the first letter.16 Apart from providing the most accurate
information, the purpose of the second letter is to keep the feedback information salient as
the exam period draws nearer. Consequently, we base our estimates of the effects of different
feedback types on the content of the second letter.
Social Comparison. The visualization of the relative performance information in the treat-
ment group can be seen in Figure 2.17 A bar chart compares the individual student’s obtained
credits to the “Top 20%” and to the “Average” student enrolled in the same bachelor’s pro-
gram and the same semester as the student receiving the letter. “Average” performance is
defined as the number of credits obtained by the median student(s), and "Top 20%" refers to
the performance of the student(s) on the 80th percentile.
Social comparison theory suggests that perceived similarity increases the tendency to
engage in social comparisons (Festinger 1954). In order to increase perceived similarity with
and to minimize ‘psychological distance’ to the reference group (compare Trope and Liber-
man 2010) we further personalize the relative performance information. We define several
comparison groups within each degree program: In smaller programs the comparison group
consists of students "who in/before ⟨year⟩ earned their school leaving certificate.", where
year equals the year in which the addressee of the letter received their school leaving certifi-
cate (this is in the International Business, Business Engineering, and the Energy and Building
Services Engineering programs; see Table 2). In the large bachelor programs Business Ad-
ministration and Mechanical Engineering, we further decompose the comparison groups by
additionally referring to “students who in/before ⟨year⟩ earned the same kind of school leav-
ing certificate as you", and we distinguish between the certificates “vocational track degree
(or below)” and “general track degree”.
Finally, an important feature of the feedback is that it provides a normative framing of the
student’s relative performance. The framing conveys that performing at least at the average
level is approved of. It categorizes the students’ performance as “good” (plus one “smiley”
emoticon) for students at or above the average, and “great” (plus two “smiley” emoticons)
for students in the top 20%. Students below average receive a neutral statement "currently
below average" (and no emoticon), and the approving normative messages are greyed out.
We define as “positive feedback” a situation where the student both receives an approv-
16See the Data and Methods Appendix for details on the reasons and the number of observations that are
affected.
17The design is inspired by the Social Comparison Module of OPOWER’s Home Energy Reports (Allcott 2011,
Allcott and Rogers 2014, and Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius 2007).
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ing normative framing (“great” or “good”) and the information that they have obtained an
above average number of credits, i.e. they are also given fundamentals that match the ap-
proving normative framing – this is true for all students above the average. Students on
the average receive “ambiguous feedback”: an approving normative statement that is not
backed by matching fundamentals, because the student receives information that the ob-
tained number of credits is only average.18 Finally, we label the feedback that students below
the average receive as “negative” since they do not see an approving normative framing, and
also receive information that their performance was below average.
2.3 Field Experiment II: Replication
We replicate the experiment one year later (N= 797, Table 2 provides an overview of all degree
programs and the number of students in the replication; Tables 4 and 5 show the balanc-
ing properties19). The aim is to establish with a new cohort of students whether the results
are reproducible. Finding credible evidence that results can be reproduced is an important
goal of our study, especially given the inconclusive results in the literature and the recent
debate about replicability in economics and other fields (Camerer, Dreber, Forsell, Ho, Hu-
ber, Johannesson, Kirchler, Almenberg, Altmejd, Chan et al. 2016, Duvendack, Palmer-Jones
and Reed 2017, and Open Science Collaboration 2015). The replication experiment uses the
same design as the original experiment. The only small tweak is that as a reaction to find-
ing performance enhancing effects of positive feedback in Experiment I (see Section 4.3), we
now use the mean instead of the median as the cutoff above which students receive positive
feedback. This retains all features of the original experiment while at the same time allowing
us to provide 56% of the students instead of 37.5% with positive feedback and reducing the
number of students that receive ambiguous feedback from 165 to 29 (because many students
obtained exactly the median amount of credits in the first semester and because the mean is
smaller than the median for observed credits in the first semester).
3 Theoretical Considerations
This section provides some theoretical intuition on how our intervention may affect behav-
ior. As described above, we provide individuals with normatively framed information about
18In one of the smaller study programs in Experiment I, the median coincides with the 80th percentile. 15
students therefore receive feedback indicating that they are in the top 20%, but at the same time their perfor-
mance is average. Because they do not meet all our criteria necessary for the label “positive feedback” they are
in the “ambiguous feedback” category. Our results are robust to classifying them into the “positive feedback”
category.
19We adjusted the randomization procedure in Experiment II. See the Data Appendix for details.
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their performance relative to their peers. Social comparison theory suggests that such infor-
mation will set social reference points (e.g., Festinger 1954, Suls and Wheeler 2000, or Wood
1989), and there are several theoretical reasons why individuals may change their behavior
in response to reference points established by the feedback.
First, feedback may affect self-confidence and have a positive effect on motivation, thus
increasing willpower and perseverance – which can ultimately lead to better performance.
In Bénabou and Tirole (2002), positive news serves individuals to maintain a positive self-
image, which in turn motivates them. Negative news on the other hand does not adequately
enter into beliefs: individuals selectively process good information. In Compte and Postle-
waite (2004) the mechanism is similar (but not a deliberate choice of the individual): positive
outcomes are attributed to own abilities or efforts. Negative outcomes are attributed to e.g.
unfortunate circumstances and therefore do not appropriately depress self-confidence. In
both models, the induced optimism and confidence in own abilities can then lead to better
performance. Applied to our setting, a lower perceived probability of failure in an exam may
lead to higher effort levels and subsequent performance. Beyond this mechanism, confi-
dence may also have a direct effect on utility, i.e. individuals may simply enjoy feeling good
about themselves (Bénabou and Tirole 2002, Compte and Postlewaite 2004, and Köszegi
2006). This may also be a motivational factor for effort allocation.
The normative framing of feedback with approving messages (or their absence) gives the
recipient of the feedback clear indication of when performance should be considered good
and therefore is suited to bolster confidence.20 Applied to our setting, for students who re-
ceive good news (positive feedback) the treatment may cause an increase in self-confidence,
which helps subsequent performance. On the other hand, the postulated selective process-
ing of information suggests that we may not see adverse effects of bad news, i.e. of negative
feedback (this potential dichotomy in information processing is closely related to the liter-
ature on the disregarding and discounting of negative information, which we also discuss
later in this section).
The idea in Bénabou and Tirole (2002), where confidence is manifested as beliefs over
ability, is closely related to the models in Azmat and Iriberri (2010) and Ertac (2005). Here,
individuals have only incomplete knowledge of their own ability.21 Formally, they only know
that their ability is drawn from a normal distribution with known parameters. All individuals
20The approving normative frame should e.g. make it more likely that a very ambitious individual will take
performance between the average and the 80th percentile as good news rather than negative information.
21Azmat, Bagues, Cabrales and Iriberri (2018) develop a further theoretical framework to explain how infor-
mation can influence performance. They focus on a situation where individuals already have good knowledge
of their own ability in terms of GPA. Our setting is different, as we provide feedback with regard to credit points
and show that individuals have little prior knowledge about their own ability in terms of credit points (see
Section 4.6).
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then receive a private signal about their performance, which can be used to update beliefs
about ability. In our setting one could think of the individually passed exams and obtained
credits as this private signal. When relative feedback is given, this signal about the average
performance of the other students will additionally affect self-perceived ability by providing
information about how hard the task was. It can be shown that if the task was of average
difficulty22 and under the assumption that ability and effort are complements in generating
performance, students will invest more effort if they receive information that they have per-
formed above average, and less effort if they receive information that they have performed
below average. In our setting this translates to higher (lower) performance after receiving
positive (negative) feedback. Combined with the idea of self-confidence managing individ-
uals in Bénabou and Tirole (2002), we may however only see an effect of positive feedback,
as the negative feedback may be discarded.
Second, relative performance information can influence the behavior of individuals with
competitive preferences. One way to specify these is to include an additive social compar-
ison component in the utility function that penalizes individuals for performing below the
expected average and rewards them for performing above the expected average (see, e.g.
Azmat and Iriberri 2010 or Kandel and Lazear 1992). Following Azmat and Iriberri (2010),
relative performance information will increase the precision of the expectation about aver-
age performance, and individuals will put more weight on the competitive part of the utility
function. The weight should be especially high when the competitive situation is stressed
and made salient, as may be the case when normative messages are included. As a conse-
quence, we expect treated students to increase performance relative to the control group.
Note that this is the case irrespective of a student’s position relative to the reference point.
Third, the reference points in the feedback letter may convey a descriptive social norm,
by describing how others behave. The focus theory of normative conduct suggests that indi-
viduals try to comply with descriptive norms, predicting positive treatment effects for those
below the descriptive norm (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990 or Cialdini 2011). However,
at the same time negative effects for individuals who perform above the norm are implied
(labeled a “boomerang” effect in the social norms literature).
The solution suggested in the literature is to add an approving normative message, i.e.
an injunctive norm for those who exceed the descriptive norm. This can prevent boomerang
effects and sometimes generates additional positive treatment effects (Allcott 2011, Cialdini
2003, Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe and Vlaev 2017, and Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and
Griskevicius 2007). Our normatively framed relative performance feedback can be under-
22This seems reasonable, because we give relative feedback on the performance in the entire semester and
students usually write multiple exams per semester. The assumption is then that while each particular exam
may be more or less difficult, in sum these exams are of average difficulty.
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stood as such a combination of descriptive and injunctive norms. An important caveat is
that this may fail to produce beneficial effects if the two norms are not in alignment (Cial-
dini, Demaine, Sagarin, Barrett, Rhoads and Winter 2006). In our case this could mean that
the normative message only works if it is aligned with the information of the relative perfor-
mance feedback, e.g. if the approving normative message is supported by information about
an above average performance. Ambiguous feedback could then possibly result in zero ef-
fects because the descriptive norm and the normative message are not aligned. Negative
feedback should increase performance, and students who receive positive feedback should
keep their behavior unchanged or exert more effort.23
All three mechanisms predict that students who receive positive feedback will increase
their subsequent performance, or leave it unchanged. The prediction for negative feedback
is less clear. While descriptive norms and competitive preferences suggest an increase in
performance, a downward adjustment of perceived ability should lower performance when
effort and ability are complements. This ambiguity is further complicated by the above de-
scribed potentially selective processing of information when self-confidence matters, and
information avoidance in general. Individuals may choose not to receive information at all,
or discount negative information (see e.g., Eil and Rao 2011, Grossman and Owens 2012, and
Möbius, Niederle, Niehaus and Rosenblat 2014). Potential reasons for this behavior in our
context could be disappointment aversion, anxiety, and optimism maintenance (Golman,
Hagmann and Loewenstein 2017).24 Hence, it could be the case that students who receive
negative feedback will discount or disregard it. As a consequence, the relative performance
information would not set a social reference point for those students, and we would thus
expect that they do not change their subsequent performance.
It is important to note that the experiments were not designed with the goal of testing
the different mechanisms against each other. In the empirical analysis, we will therefore not
be able to pin down what mechanism exactly is driving the results. However, this section
has shown that the notion of positive feedback being (weakly) beneficial to performance is
common to all of the discussed theories. Consistent with this overarching sentiment, our re-
sults will provide robust evidence that positive feedback does indeed increase performance.
23Note that in our case the average performance and the performance of the 80th percentile may both con-
stitute descriptive norms. Students below average (negative feedback) are below both reference points, so no
matter which norm they pick, the theory suggests positive effects of feedback. Similarly, students in the top
20% are above both reference points and the approving framing should prevent boomerang effects and pos-
sibly even generate performance gains. Students above average and below the 80th percentile may choose a
reference point above or below. The predictions differ depending on this choice: positive effects if they choose
the higher reference point, and a possible boomerang effect if they choose the lower reference point. However,
since they also receive a normative message of approval, we expect zero or positive effects in either case.
24The idea of information avoidance is also supported by psychologists. For surveys of the literature see e.g.,
Hertwig and Engel (2016) or Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller and Shepperd (2010).
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In our field experiments we find no evidence of negative feedback significantly affecting be-
havior in any direction. This may be because multiple mechanisms work in different direc-
tions, or because individuals discount negative information. We will provide some tentative
evidence pointing to the latter.
4 Results
In this section we first present our data, specifications, and the main findings. We then in-
vestigate drivers of the effect and potential mechanisms, as well as the effects of repeated
treatment.
4.1 Data
We use anonymized administrative student-level data provided by the university. As de-
scribed in Section 2.1, students received feedback based on the accumulated credits (ACP)
and their cumulative GPA (AGPA) and we used those variables together with demographic
information for the randomization. The administrative data is augmented by four online
surveys.
For the empirical analysis, we use exam-level data instead of the cumulative figures. This
provides more accurate information on student performance in each semester and as ex-
plained in the Data Appendix it is also the more conservative approach.25 Our main outcome
of interest is the number of obtained credits.26 In auxiliary analyses, we will also investigate
potential effects on other domains such as the number of attempted and failed exams, GPA,
dropout, and well-being. Failed exams are conditional on attempting at least one exam,
the GPA is based on passing grades, and we elicited the measures of well-being with online
surveys (see Figure 1 and Table 21 for the timing and response rates of the surveys and Ta-
ble 18 for the questions and the variables used in the estimations). As shown in the next
section, we use demographic information and baseline outcomes (first semester credits and
first semester GPA) as covariates in our estimations (see Table 1).
25The Data and Methods Appendix provides an example, and a detailed discussion of the differences between
the accumulated and the exam-level figures.
26Credit points are net of credits granted for internships, which are scheduled later in the study program
(4th/5th semester). Some students are awarded these credits at the start of their studies because they com-
pleted an apprenticeship and have work experience. As we are interested in the effect of treatment on academic
performance, we do not count these internship credits.
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4.2 Estimation
Unless otherwise specified, we provide intention-to-treat (ITT) effects from OLS estimations
that compare the average outcomes of the control and the treatment group.
The baseline specification is:
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +εi , (1)
where Y ki denotes the level of outcome measure k for individual i . Tr eatmenti is an indi-
cator for being randomized into the treatment group.
In the second specification we follow the recommendations of Bruhn and McKenzie (2009)
and control for the method of randomization:
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +siα2+εi , (2)
The vector si includes strata fixed effects which control for the random assignment of treat-
ment and control units within blocks. Strata are defined by study program dummies and
accumulated credits. In the estimation with pooled data from both experiments we also in-
clude cohort fixed effects and their interactions with the other strata variables.
For the third specification, we add a vector xi which includes covariates that capture stu-
dent ability:
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +siα2+xiα3+εi . (3)
The vector contains the high school GPA and the first semester credits (description of vari-
ables in Table 1).
In the fourth specification, we add a vector zi of additional control variables:
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +siα2+xiα3+ziα4+εi . (4)
It includes the age at randomization, an indicator for being female, the time since high
school graduation, and an indicator for the type of high school degree.
Lastly, we estimate a fifth specification in which we control for the baseline GPA (GPA
first semester):
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +siα2+xiα3+ziα4+α5B asel i neGPAi +εi . (5)
We do this in a separate specification because the first semester GPA is missing for students
who attempted no exams or failed all exams they attempted. In order to keep all observations
18
in the sample, we impute values of the first semester GPA for students with a missing GPA.27
4.3 Effects of feedback types on performance
Field Experiment I. The top panel of Table 6 shows that across all types of relative per-
formance feedback, the treatment group obtains on average roughly .6 additional credits
(Column 1). This effect is not statistically significant, and if anything, adding the control
variables in Columns (2) to (5) reduces the estimated effect.
Based on the theoretical considerations in Section 3, we are interested in whether differ-
ent feedback types lead to different behavioral responses. As explained in Section 2, students
below the average received negative feedback, while students above the average received
positive feedback. Column (7) shows that students who received positive feedback perform
significantly better than the control group counterparts (who would have also received pos-
itive feedback had they been allocated to the treatment group): they obtain on average 2.4
credits more. Adding covariates in Columns (8) to (11) reduces the effect to about 2.1 credits,
which corresponds to an effect size of roughly .2 control group standard deviations.
Columns (5) to (8) in Table 7 show that among the students receiving positive feedback,
those who range at or above the 80th percentile do not react as strongly to the treatment as
those students between the 50th and 80th percentile. How positive feedback affects the dis-
tribution of the outcome variable can be seen in the top panel of Figure 8, which shows the
density of standardized credits for individuals receiving positive feedback in the treatment
group and individuals eligible for positive feedback in the control group. Credits are stan-
dardized within study programs in order to make the distribution of the outcome variable
comparable between the different study programs.28 The distribution is left-skewed in the
treatment and the control group, but more so in the treatment group. The reason is that pos-
itive feedback predominantly moves up students from the bottom part of the distribution.
At the same time there appears to be no treatment effect for the top part of the distribution.
We analyze this more formally in the top panel of Figure 9, which depicts the coefficients of
simultaneous quantile regressions (QR) for the 10th to the 90th percentile of the credits (us-
ing the set of controls from Equation 5). The OLS estimate is also depicted for comparison,
and the figure shows a clear pattern: While the QR estimates are roughly the same as the OLS
estimate for the first five deciles, the QR estimates decrease for the upper deciles. This shows
that there are indeed no effects of positive feedback for the individuals at the top of the credit
point distribution.
27See the Data and Methods Appendix for details.
28In the regressions the credit points are not standardized. Instead, we account for the different levels of
credit points across programs by including study program fixed effects.
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The heterogeneous effects of positive feedback across the distribution of the outcome
variable could arise from ceiling effects if students are only capable of passing a certain num-
ber of exams per semester. The curriculum may also generate “artificial” ceilings if students
do not go beyond the 30 credits per semester that are on average required to graduate on
time.
While positive feedback has large and statistically significant effects, the same is not true
for other types of feedback. Table 7 shows that negative feedback (Columns 1 and 2) has
no significant effect on subsequent performance. Students whose achieved credits exactly
match the average receive ambiguous feedback, i.e. approving framing plus descriptive data
which shows that their performance was average. Interestingly, the coefficient is negative,
albeit not statistically significant (Columns 3 and 4). We further investigate the effects of
ambiguous treatment in Section 4.5.
The finding that positive feedback leads to an increase in subsequent performance is
broadly consistent with the theoretical mechanisms discussed in Section 3. We find no ef-
fect of negative feedback, which is in line with the literature if either multiple mechanisms
are relevant and work in different directions (within or across individuals), or if individuals
discount or discard negative information, e.g. in order to preserve their self-concept. We will
provide tentative evidence for the latter in Section 4.6.
Field Experiment II: Replication. In order to validate the results we found in the original
experiment, we replicate our study one year later with a new cohort of first-year students.
Our prediction for the replication was that there would again be an effect of positive feedback
on performance, and no significant effects of the other feedback types. The middle panel of
Table 6 shows the results for the replication experiment. The estimated treatment effects for
the entire sample in Columns (1 to 5) are very similar to the original experiment. More im-
portantly, we replicate the result that receiving positive feedback significantly increases per-
formance (Columns 7 to 11). This is not only interesting because the positive feedback again
generated performance-enhancing effects, but in particular because the minimal change in
design now extends the positive effects to a number of weaker students (who obtain median
or slightly below median credits). Although the differences in treatment effects across origi-
nal experiment and replication are not statistically significant, it appears that the effects are
somewhat smaller in the replication study. Even so, positive feedback increases performance
by 1.7 credits, or .16 control group standard deviations.
As in the original experiment, the results of positive feedback are mainly driven by those
between the 50th and the 80th percentile (Columns 5 to 8 in Table 7). From the bottom
panels in Figure 8 and Figure 9 the same picture as before emerges. The effects of positive
feedback are larger in the bottom half of the credit distribution of positive feedback, and we
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again see only small effects for the top part of the credit distribution.
The patterns for the other subgroups in Table 7 are also comparable. Again, we find no
significant change in performance with regard to negative feedback (though the coefficient
is negative). For the few people who still obtained exactly the average number of credits
(N= 29), we again find an insignificant negative coefficient.
Pooled results. Because the two experiments share the same design, we can pool the ob-
servations from both cohorts to increase the power of our statistical analysis. The bottom
panel of Table 6 presents the results for the pooled sample. As expected, the estimated treat-
ment effect lies between the original and replication experiment at roughly 1.8 credits (.17
control group standard deviations). The estimates are more precise due to the larger sample
size, and the effects of positive feedback are statistically significant at the 1%-level.
Overall, the results of the two field experiments provide consistent and robust evidence
that normatively framed relative performance feedback leads to an increase in subsequent
performance, but only if it is positive. The fact that we are able to reproduce the results is an
important feature of our study, especially against the backdrop of inconclusive findings on
relative performance feedback in the literature.
Magnitude of the effects. The effect sizes for positive feedback are in the range of .16 to .2
control group standard deviations and correspond to a 6-8% increase in performance rela-
tive to the control group. In the literature, the effect sizes for relative performance feedback
are very much context-dependent. Studying the effects of relative performance information
for workers, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) find an average effect of 6.8%. In a lab setting
Kuhnen and Tymula (2012) find an increase in output of 12.2%. In education, Azmat and
Iriberri (2010) find that the provision of information leads to a 5% improvement in grades
and Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) find increases in performance after rank provision of about
10%. Our effects are in the mid-range of these estimates.
The same is true when considering the effect sizes that are typically found for other types
of interventions in higher education: Dobkin, Gil and Marion (2010) find that a 10 percentage
point increase in university class attendance increases performance by .17 standard devia-
tions. Bandiera, Larcinese and Rasul (2010) find a decrease in performance of .11 standard
deviations in response to a one standard deviation increase in lecture size. Carrell and West
(2010) show that an increase in professor quality raises academic performance by .05 stan-
dard deviations, and Carrell, Fullerton and West (2009) find that an increase in peer quality
has an effect of .08 standard deviations. Finally, we can compare our results to other stud-
ies that use obtained credits as an outcome. Leuven, Oosterbeek and Klaauw (2010) find
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that monetary incentives increase the obtained credits of high ability students by about 17%.
De Paola, Scoppa and Nisticò (2012) also look at financial incentives, and find that it leads to
an increase in obtained credits by .18 standard deviations.
Overall, this tentatively suggests that providing a specific type of feedback – positive feed-
back – may be an attractive way of inducing changes in behavior, especially when consider-
ing the low cost compared to some of the other interventions just mentioned.29
4.4 Positive feedback or unobserved factors?
So far, we have shown robust evidence that positive feedback substantially improves student
performance. One possible explanation could be the following: Students receive positive
feedback (or qualify for positive feedback but were allocated to the control group), because
they have a higher first semester performance, and are therefore also likely to have on aver-
age different underlying characteristics than students who do not receive positive feedback.
For example, they may have higher ability and a better learning technology at their disposal,
and therefore they may be more able to respond to the treatment. In that case, the positive
nature of the treatment may not matter, it could simply be the case that high ability stu-
dents react better to relative performance feedback. In the following, we show that higher
ability or other unobserved characteristics of students that receive positive feedback cannot
explain our findings, and that it is in fact the positive nature of the feedback that changes the
subsequent performance.
Similar to Allcott (2011) the design of our feedback intervention allows us to employ a
sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) for the treated students, as receiving positive or
negative feedback follows a clear rule. Because here we are interested in the effect of positive
versus negative feedback, we exclude individuals that receive ambiguous feedback. When
implementing the RDD we follow in large parts the suggestions of Lee and Lemieux (2010).
If the usual assumption for RDD holds, i.e. if there are no other discontinuities around the
cut-off, it will provide a causal local average treatment effect (LATE) of receiving positive in-
stead of negative feedback. To gather some intuition if this assumption is likely to hold, we
can look at the behavior of the control group in absence of relative feedback information.30
As running variable we are using the accumulated credits (ACP) a student obtained in the
29Table 3 shows that our intervention has a per student cost of undere 2.5 per semester.
30Another assumption is that individuals have no or only imprecise control over the assignment variable
(Lee and Lemieux 2010). This is very likely to hold in our case as when studying for their first semester exams,
individuals do not know that they are going to receive feedback (let alone what form the feedback will have).
Even if they did know, it would be virtually impossible to infer the exact value of the average performance in
their comparison group or to precisely determine their position in the distribution of the assignment variable.
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first semester, divided by the average ACP of her respective comparison group31 (the cor-
responding distributions for the first experiment are shown in the left panels of Figure 10).
Next, the left panels in Figure 11 provide a graphical depiction of the behavior of the outcome
variable around the cut-off. For the treatment group we see a notable jump in the second
semester credits, while we only observe a small jump for the control group. One explanation
for the small jump in the control group could be the exclusion of individuals that receive
ambiguous feedback, which could lead to discontinuities in the distributions of unobserved
variables that are correlated with the obtained credits in the second semester.32 To estimate
the size of the jumps we implement a parametric RDD, using the following equation:
Y ki =α0+α1Pi + f (xi)+ f (xi)Pi +siα2+εi , (6)
where Pi indicates if a person receives positive feedback or, in case of the control group, is
eligible to receive it. f (xi) is any smooth function of the running variable xi that we allow
to vary between the left and the right side of the cut-off and si is a vector including study
program fixed effects and, in pooled estimations, also a cohort fixed effect and its interac-
tion with the study program fixed effects.33 The two upper panels of Columns (1) and (2)
in Table 8 provide the estimated coefficients of α1 for the treatment and the control group
using two different discontinuity samples and a first order polynomial. The estimations con-
firm the results from the graphical illustration. For the treatment group the RDD indicates
that receiving positive instead of negative feedback increases subsequent performance by at
least seven credits. However, because of their size, the insignificant estimates for the con-
trol group could still suggest unobserved discontinuities around the cut-off. To account
for any jump in our outcome variable due to unobserved discontinuities that are the same
in the treatment and the control group we estimate the following regression discontinuity
difference-in-difference (RD-DID) specification:34
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +α2Pi +α3Tr eatmenti Pi+xi +xi Tr eatmenti +xi Pi +xi Tr eatmenti Pi +siα4+εi , (7)
31This provides a smoother distribution around the cut-off than using the raw distance to the cut-off, because
of differences in the credit point distributions within the different comparison groups.
32Another reason for a jump in the control group outcome at the cut-off could be that students share the
content of the letters with each others, which could create spillovers. Observing no jump for the control group
would therefore indicate that this is either not the case, or that there are no effects from this spillover on control
group behavior.
33We do not include the vector xi, zi, and the baseline GAP as covariates, as this can make it difficult to differ-
entiate between an inappropriate functional form and discontinuities in the covariates (see Lee and Lemieux
2010).
34See e.g., Danzer and Lavy (2018) or Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) for papers that make use of similar
RD-DID specifications.
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where we are interested in the parameter α3. The results for this specification are shown in
the bottom panel of Table 8. The coefficients in Column (1) and (2) indicate that there is still
an effect of receiving positive instead of negative feedback, though the effect loses much of
its significance.
As before, we can study the robustness of those findings by looking at the results for the
second experiment. Using the mean as a cut-off leads to some differences. The right panel of
Figure 10 shows that larger parts of the distribution are now above the cut-off, in part because
the median of this distribution lies above the mean. Moreover, there are now far fewer stu-
dents that receive ambiguous feedback, and therefore, less observations are excluded from
the analysis. The results of this can be seen in the RDD plots in the right panel of Figure 11.
The jump for the treatment group is larger in the second experiment and we do not observe
any jump for the control group, which suggests that it is indeed the higher number of ex-
cluded individuals that leads to the jump in the control group of the first experiment. The
corresponding estimates of Equations 6 and 7 are shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8
and they confirm the results from the first experiment.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 show the results for the pooled sample. The higher num-
ber of observations also allows us to show that the estimated coefficients are robust to dif-
ferent polynomial specifications and discontinuity samples (Table 9).35 As an additional ro-
bustness check, Figures 12 to 15 depict the behavior of pre-treatment covariates around the
cut-off for the two experiments. Many of them behave smoothly. In the cases where we do
observe discontinuities, they behave very similar in the treatment and the control group.
Therefore, Equation 7 should provide credible estimates.
The RDD results provide robust evidence that receiving positive instead of negative feed-
back leads to an increase in performance by at least six credits, for a student around the
cut-off. This shows that for students of the same underlying ability the type of feedback is
crucial for subsequent performance. This is in stark contrast to Allcott (2011), Brent, Lott,
Taylor, Cook, Rollins and Stoddard (2017), and Costa and Kahn (2013) who implement simi-
lar RDD designs in an environmental context and find zero effects around the cutoff – which
they interpret as evidence that varying normative framing alone does not affect behavior.
The fact that we find a different effect and reproduce it in another experiment indicates that
the context in which relative feedback and normative frames are provided plays an impor-
tant role, and that the combination of both should receive more attention in contexts with
complex and high-stakes tasks.
Regarding the theoretical considerations in Section 3, the results of the RDD tentatively
35With smaller discontinuity samples, higher order polynomials lead to overfitting and the corresponding
estimates for the jump become imprecise and unreliable.
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indicate that more precise knowledge about one’s ability alone cannot fully explain the in-
crease in performance. The RDD minimizes the difference in the credit points to the left
and right of the cut-off point, and information updating about one’s ability should lead to
a continuous increase in performance. The approving normative framing of above average
performance (aligned with matching descriptive information) could generate a discontinu-
ous jump in subsequent performance, and if positive and negative feedback have diverging
effects on performance, e.g. because negative information is discounted, this could also trig-
ger a jump in performance.
4.5 Approving normative framing with(out) matching fundamentals
With the RDD we have shown that receiving positive instead of negative feedback matters
for students around the cut-off. The positive feedback consists of two elements that nega-
tive feedback does not have: an approving normative framing and matching fundamentals
showing that the student is better than average. This leads to the question of whether the ap-
proving normative framing alone can raise performance. The fact that in the original exper-
iment we find no effect (even negative point estimates) for students on the median suggests
otherwise (these students receive a normative message of approval without the matching
fundamentals; see the results in Table 7). However, the lack of positive effects on these indi-
viduals may be due to some unobserved underlying characteristic.
The replication experiment allows us to further investigate this. Again, we saw no signif-
icant effect and a negative point estimate for students with ambiguous feedback in Exper-
iment II (Table 7). But in addition, switching the peer information from the median to the
mean in Experiment II allows more insights. We can calculate the median performance, and
identify students who under the median rule of the original experiment would have received
ambiguous feedback. Because they are now being compared to the mean, and mean credits
are lower than median credits in most comparison groups, 80 of those students now receive
positive feedback or are eligible to receive it. Assuming that those obtaining median credits
are similar across cohorts, we can compare the treatment effect for those on the median in
the original experiment with the treatment effect for those on the median in the replication.
The only difference between the two groups is that those in the replication are shown funda-
mentals that match the approving normative message, and hence receive positive feedback.
In Table 10 we show the results from this exercise and see that the treatment coefficient
for those on the median in the replication is positive – although not statistically signifi-
cant. We take this as tentative evidence that the absence of a treatment effect for ambigu-
ous feedback is not due to underlying characteristics of those students that have a median
first semester performance. It is more plausible that an approving normative framing with-
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out the matching fundamentals has no effect on performance. Our results then tentatively
suggest that providing the same individuals with matching fundamentals in addition to the
normative message of approval may actually turn the zero-effect into a positive effect on
performance.
The above finding additionally suggests that competitive preferences alone do not ex-
plain our results. Students who receive ambiguous feedback do not improve their perfor-
mance. However, unless ambiguous feedback is disregarded, individuals with competitive
preferences should exert more effort when the information about the reference group’s per-
formance becomes more precise (see e.g., Azmat and Iriberri 2010).
4.6 Expectations and Treatment Effects
As discussed in Section 3 there are a number of theoretical reasons why students might react
to feedback. One prerequisite in all considered mechanisms is that the feedback provides
new or unexpected information. Therefore, a natural question that arises is how student
expectations about relative performance line up with actual relative performance. In the
replication experiment, we surveyed students on their expected performance in terms of
credits and GPA (Table 11 shows the questions36).
One caveat applies when considering the data from the surveys: the response rates are
between 15 and 20% (see Table 21 in the Data and Methods Appendix). Accordingly our
sample is rather small, and we find evidence that the respondents are a positively selected
subpopulation. It is reassuring that in the subsample we use for the estimations in Table 12
the covariates are overall well balanced between the treatment and the control group (see
Table 22).
We first assess how accurately students predict their actual rank in terms of credits and
GPA in the pre-treatment semester. The top panel in Figure 16 plots the rank students ex-
pected to have in the first semester against the actual rank, in terms of credits. The in-
significant rank correlation coefficient of .084 indicates that students have very little intu-
ition about their actual relative performance. The bottom panel shows the corresponding
figure for the GPA. In this case, the significant rank correlation coefficient of .228 suggests
36The wording in the pre- and post-treatment survey is not the same. While this may have level effects on
control and treatment groups simultaneously, it should not affect the argument about differential updating
between treatment and control we make in this section. Also, in the surveys we asked students about their
expectations in terms of the rank/percentile, while our feedback provides them with the information if they
performed above/below the average. To make our argument consistent we assume that expecting to belong to
the top 50% (bottom 50%) is equivalent to expecting an above (below) average performance for the students.
If students actually make a distinction between median and mean, due to the mean being smaller than the
median this means that e.g. not everyone who expected to be below the 50th percentile will be surprised by
positive feedback – this measurement error should make it harder for us to find results.
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that students have at least some idea about their actual relative performance in terms of
GPA, even before they receive their first grades. This supports our notion that relative per-
formance feedback on grades as in Azmat, Bagues, Cabrales and Iriberri (2018) may well have
different effects compared to our study, because students already have a better idea about
the underlying performance distribution in terms of grades.
The second important question is whether students incorporate the feedback informa-
tion into their post-treatment expectations. The top panel of Figure 17 displays the share
among above average students who correctly expected an above average performance, be-
fore and after receiving positive feedback. The left panel supports what we saw in Figure
16. Before our treatment, only around 50% of students eligible for positive feedback cor-
rectly expected to perform above average, both in the treatment and the control group. In
the semester after the start of our intervention, among above average performers, 87% in the
treatment group and 68% in the control group correctly expected to be above average per-
formers, and the difference of 19 percentage points is significant at the 5% level. This sug-
gests two things. First, those who performed above average learn about their relative perfor-
mance, even in the absence of relative feedback. Second, and more importantly, providing
students with feedback leads to a stronger update in the expected relative performance.
The bottom panel of Figure 17 shows the share among below average students who in-
correctly expected an above average performance. In the first semester, nearly half of these
students overestimated their performance. Interestingly, in this case neither the control nor
the treatment group appears to update their expected relative performance in the second or
third semester. However, the number of below average students who took part in the survey
is very low (N in the three surveys is never larger than 30), and this is reflected in the large
confidence intervals. We thus very cautiously take this as evidence that students who receive
negative feedback do indeed discard or discount the information.
Finally, as discussed in Section 3, we expect that individuals who initially expected to per-
form below average respond to positive feedback. These students received new information,
in contrast to students who already expected that they would perform above average. To test
if this does indeed affect the treatment effect, we create a dummy Ui that is 1 if students
underestimated their performance in the first semester, i.e. they expected a below average
performance, although they then actually performed better than the average. We estimate
the following equation for all students that were better than average and therefore received
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positive feedback, or were eligible to receive it:37
Y ki =α0+α1Tr eatmenti +α2Ui +α3Tr eatmentiUi +siα4+εi , (8)
whereα1 gives the treatment effect for those who correctly expected to be above average, and
α3 gives the difference in the treatment effect for those who underestimated their relative
performance. Table 12 presents the results. Column (2) shows that the treatment effect for
those who correctly estimated their position is roughly 1.6 credits, which is 1.1 points smaller
than the treatment effect that we find in the survey sample (Column 1) . Control group stu-
dents who underestimated their relative performance obtain on average 2.1 credits less in
the second semester. However, the interaction suggests that informing those students that
they actually are above the average can increase their performance to the level of those who
correctly anticipated to be above average. In Column (3 to 5) we add our controls. Especially
the pre-treatment performance measures are likely to be correlated with the first semester
expectations. The negative effect of underestimating performance becomes stronger and
significant. Given the controls, this may indicate that at equal ability, lower confidence is
detrimental to performance. Again, the effect is completely offset by receiving positive feed-
back. The treatment generates a significant effect of 5.3 credits for students that underesti-
mated their relative performance. This indicates that relative performance feedback at the
beginning of university might be especially helpful for students who underestimate their rel-
ative performance in the absence of such information.
The last insight comes from Figure 17. The top right shows that in the third semester a
large majority of students, both in the treatment and the control group, correctly expected an
above average performance. If differences in beliefs about being an above average student
between treatment and control group produce our results (e.g. by increasing motivation and
effort), one could expect that there will be no differences in the third semester performance,
because both groups now share the same beliefs.
4.7 Repeated Treatment
It is not straightforward how to evaluate the consequences of repeated treatment. Once the
interest is centered on the effects of the different types of feedback, some caveats regarding
the analysis have to be considered. First, it is endogenous what type of feedback students
receive in the third semester, because their relative performance in the second semester is
affected by the initial feedback letters. This is illustrated with the transition probabilities
37The number of survey respondents who perform below the average is too low to study their behavior more
formally.
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(and their differentials) of the pooled sample in Table 20. They show the movement between
different types of feedback, from the beginning of the second to the beginning of the third
semester. Both in the treatment and the control group, only about 5% of the students that
were below the average at the end of the first semester are able to move above it by the end of
the second semester. Also, while students of both groups tend to stay above average, treated
students are more likely to do so, because of their improved performance. As a consequence
of this differential movement within the credit distribution after the initial feedback letters,
we only analyze the effects of receiving a certain type of feedback in the second semester on
performance in the third semester.
Second, as is also indicated by the transition matrices, our intervention could lead to
differential drop-out behavior. Columns (3 and 4) and (7 and 8) of Table 17 show the effects
of treatment on the dropout decision for both experiments and the pooled sample. While
most of the coefficients are insignificant, the signs indicate that positive feedback leads to
lower dropout. For the analysis of repeated treatment we exclude all students that dropped
out before the start of the third semester. This is conservative if we assume that students who
drop out are those with lower performance, and we therefore might underestimate the true
effect of repeated treatment.38
The results are displayed in Table 13 and in Table 14. We find no significant effects on
the third semester performance across all types of feedback. The findings hold in both ex-
periments and in the pooled sample. Table 15 shows Lee bounds (Lee 2009) for the effects
of the different feedback types in the third semester. Overall, the lack of effects for repeated
treatment is in line with our findings in Section 4.6 and the idea that treatment is effective if
students receive new information from the feedback letters.
4.8 Channels and effects on other domains: exams taken, exams failed,
GPA, and well-being
We have found robust effects of positive feedback on credit points, the target of the inter-
vention. What are the channels by which students generate these gains in performance? Do
they sacrifice grade achievement for gains in credits in the process? Are there perhaps other
(psychological) costs associated with encouraging students to obtain more credits?
First, we investigate the two ways in which students can obtain more credits: attempt
more exams and/or fail fewer exams. Columns (5) to (8) of Table 16 show that students who
receive positive feedback do both. The effect on attempted exams is larger in the first exper-
38Tables 23 and 24 in the Data and Methods Appendix show that this leaves us with a sample in which the
covariates are overall well balanced between treatment and control group.
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iment, while the effect on the number of failed exams is larger in the second experiment. In
the pooled sample, treated students attempt about .17 more exams and fail .11 less. Mul-
tiplying those coefficients by the average number of credits students are awarded for an
exam (5.75 credit points) and adding them up comes very close to the treatment effect for
the pooled sample in Table 6.
Second, a concern could be that encouraging students to obtain more credits may come
at a cost in terms of lower grades, because students may shift attention away from grades.
In Columns (1 and 2) and (5 and 6) of Table 17 we report the effects on the second semester
GPA. We do not find any significant effects. It appears that positive feedback can raise per-
formance in terms of obtained credits, without negatively affecting the other performance
dimension.
Lastly, one might worry that the feedback affects other dimensions that are not directly
related to performance. For both our experiments we conducted a post-treatment survey
(Figure 1) in which we asked students how often they attend the lectures, how satisfied they
are with their life, the degree to which they are satisfied with their study program, the degree
to which they are satisfied with their performance, and how stressful they find their studies
(see Table 18 for the survey questions and the variables used in the estimations).39 Table
19 shows the effects of negative and positive feedback on these outcomes.40. We find no
indication that the effects of positive feedback are driven by an increase in lecture visits. We
also find no evidence that they come at the cost of being less satisfied with life, studying
or performance, or that they are accompanied by a higher stress level. If anything, positive
feedback might increase life and study satisfaction. For the small number of students who
received negative feedback and answered the survey, the results tentatively suggest that it
increases lecture attendance, life, study, and performance satisfaction.
5 Conclusion
We investigated the effects of normatively framed relative performance feedback in a setting
where individuals enter a new environment, and are therefore unfamiliar with the underly-
ing performance distribution. In the first experiment we find evidence for differential effects
of positive and negative feedback. The replication shows that the results are robust: we re-
produce all results from the original experiment.
39Table 25 in the Data and Methods Appendix shows that even in this subsample most of the covariates are
still balanced between the treatment and the control group. Note that the table also includes students who
received ambiguous feedback, which explains the higher number of observations compared to Table 18
40The number of observations can vary between the outcomes, as students were allowed to give no answers
to the questions in the survey.
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Positive relative performance feedback improves performance, and we show that the in-
crease in obtained course credits is indeed the effect of the positive nature of the feedback,
and not of some unobserved characteristics. Because we observe the entire universe of uni-
versity performance (including grades as the second performance dimension), our results
can be interpreted as net gains. We find no evidence for effects of negative feedback, and
normative messages of approval alone (i.e. ambiguous feedback) do not increase subse-
quent performance, either. Furthermore, we provide suggestive evidence that positive feed-
back is especially effective for those who underestimate their relative performance, and that
the treatment effects are linked to a more accurate assessment of performance. Absent treat-
ment, above average students over time also learn about their relative ability, and the perfor-
mance of treatment and control group converges. This is also in line with the notion that it
is indeed the informational advantage that generates the performance gains.
Our experiments were not designed with the goal of testing different theories. Yet the
lack of evidence for significant effects of negative feedback at first glance seems to suggest
that neither competitive preferences nor social norms can explain the results, as both would
predict performance gains with negative feedback. However, we find survey evidence that
negative feedback is not processed in the same way as positive feedback. If students dis-
card negative feedback, our results are, in fact, compatible with all the theoretically stipu-
lated mechanisms. While the findings are thus broadly consistent with theory, they leave
some interesting questions and open up avenues for future research that can disentangle
the potential mechanisms. It would also be worth investigating whether the combination
of normative frame with information leads to a larger effect than relative feedback without
normative messages. Due to the fixed cohort size and the resulting power, our experiments
did not test this.
The results also have important implications from a policy perspective. The interven-
tion increases student performance at the beginning stages of university, arguably a crucial
time for getting on track to graduation. It is also low cost, and easy to implement in other
contexts where individuals enter a new environment, e.g. when starting a new job. Im-
portantly, the fact that we find and replicate performance enhancing effects where Azmat,
Bagues, Cabrales and Iriberri (2018) and Cabrera and Cid (2017) do not find performance
gains, suggests that the chosen performance dimension and the initial level of information
about the underlying performance distribution may matter. In addition, our results sug-
gest that individuals who perform above average benefit from relative feedback while there
is no evidence that negative feedback is helpful. Future feedback schemes can be designed
to take this heterogeneity into account and attempt to extend the benefits to below average
students. One approach could be to combine relative feedback for above average students
with other forms, e.g. self-referential feedback, for struggling students.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Variable Description
Treatment Variables
Treatment Random assignment to the treatment group
Stratification Variables
Study Program Indicators for study programs; for more information see Table 2.
Credit Strata Indicating strata based on accumulated first-semester credit points
(ACP).a)
Control Variables
Age Age in years
Female Indicator for being female
HS Degree Abitur Indicator for a general track degree (“Abitur”); reference category in-
cludes vocational track degree (“Fachhochschulreife”) and students
who hold other degrees.
Time since HS Degree Time in years since high school graduation
HS GPA Final high school grade point average (1=best, 4=worst); missing val-
ues imputed.a)
GPA 1st Semester First semester grade point average (course-levelb); 1=best, 4=worst);
failed exams are not included in calculation. Missing values
imputed.a)
Credits 1st Semester Number of credit points (course-level)b) obtained in the first
semester net of credits granted for an internship.a)
Feedback Variables
ACP Accumulated first semester credit points (module-level)b); feedback
type is based on this variable.
AGPA Cumulative first semester grade point average (module-levelb);
1=best, 4=worst); failed exams are not included in calculation. Vari-
able was used as balancing covariate in the randomization.
Outcome Variablesc)
Credits Number of credit points obtained in the semester, net of credits
granted for an internship
Attempted Exams Number of attempted exams in the semester
Failed Exams Number of failed exams in the semester; excludes students who at-
tempted no exams.
GPA Current grade point average (1=best, 4=worst); failed exams are not
included in calculation.
Dropout Indicator for having dropped out of the study program.
Note: a) For details see Data and Methods Appendix. b) Course-level: includes partly completed multiple-course-modules
(= passed sub-modules). Module-level: considers only fully completed modules. For more details see Data and Methods





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: SUMMARY OF COST INCURRED BY THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK (IN EUROS)
Cost calculation for relative performance feedback (cohort of 800)
Student assistant (60 hours per semester *e 11.70) e 702
Postage (2 letters *e 0.48 * 800 students) e 768
Printing of letters (2 letters * 2 pages *e 0.12 * 800 students) e 384
Printing of letters 2nd language (2 letters * 2 pages *e 0.12 * 140 students) e 67.20
Envelopes (2 letters *e 0.02 * 800 students) e 32
Total cost per semester e 1,953.20























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: RDD ESTIMATES – EFFECT OF POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE FEEDBACK, DIFFERENT POLYNO-
MIALS AND DISCONTINUITY SAMPLES
Pooled: Treatment Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0 < Ratio < 2 0.25 < Ratio < 1.75 0.5 < Ratio < 1.5 0.75 < Ratio < 1.25
1st Order Polynomial 8.230*** 7.016*** 8.554*** 10.096***
(1.541) (1.596) (2.145) (3.292)
2nd Order Polynomial 7.923*** 10.564*** 9.022** 16.225**
(2.569) (2.755) (3.693) (6.278)
3rd Order Polynomial 10.711*** 7.963* 12.214** -1.967
(3.727) (4.124) (5.631) (13.831)
4th Order Polynomial 10.973** 12.914** 15.443* -8.142
(4.956) (5.672) (9.305) (29.994)
N 594 550 427 246
Study Program FE YES YES YES YES
Pooled: Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0 < Ratio < 2 0.25 < Ratio < 1.75 0.5 < Ratio < 1.5 0.75 < Ratio < 1.25
1st Order Polynomial 1.992 0.484 0.613 -1.847
(1.693) (1.815) (2.293) (4.152)
2nd Order Polynomial -1.257 -0.114 -2.675 5.775
(2.744) (3.152) (4.326) (7.392)
3rd Order Polynomial 0.739 -1.087 6.102 -7.244
(4.198) (4.951) (6.569) (14.912)
4th Order Polynomial -0.650 2.182 -3.333 37.970
(5.826) (6.789) (10.206) (41.316)
N 611 569 452 254
Study Program FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Outcome variable: credits 2nd semester; study program FE: include a cohort dummy and its interaction with the study program FE. Running
variable: ratio of accumulated 1st semester credits (ACP) to the comparison group median (mean) credits (ACP). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 10: MEDIAN PERFORMANCE AND TREATMENT EFFECTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experiment I
Ambiguous Feedback -1.241 -1.313 -1.448 -1.591 -1.580
(1.394) (1.404) (1.295) (1.336) (1.190)
N 165 165 165 165 165
Experiment II: Replication
Positive Feedback 3.430 2.615 2.593 3.126 2.515
(2.117) (2.214) (2.219) (2.177) (2.100)
N 80 80 80 80 80
Strata FE NO YES YES YES YES
Ability Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Background Variables NO NO NO YES YES
GPA 1st Semester NO NO NO NO YES
Note: The samples include students who obtained the median number of credits. In Experiment I these students
received ambiguous feedback. In Experiment II these students received positive feedback (but would have
received ambiguous feedback under the design of Experiment I because they performed above the mean but not
above the median). Outcome variable: credits 2nd semester; strata FE: credit strata FE, study program FE, and in
the pooled estimations a cohort dummy and its interaction with the study program FE; ability controls: HS GPA
and credits 1st semester; background variables: age, female dummy, time since HS degree, and HS degree Abitur
dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 11: SURVEY QUESTIONS ON STUDENT EXPECTATIONS IN EXPERIMENT II
First semester
Credits Assume that there are 100 students who have started studying at the
same time and are enrolled in the same degree. If you were to rank
all 100 students by their credit points (ECTS), such that rank 1 is the
student with the highest number of credit points and 100 is the student
with the lowest ECTS. In which position do you think you would be?
GPA And in which rank you would be with respect to your grade point aver-
age, if rank 1 is the student with the best grade point average and 100
is the student with the worst grade point average?
Second and third semester
Credits What do you think? How many per cent of your fellow students will
have achieved more credit points (ECTS) than you at the end of the
current semester?
GPA And in your opinion, how many per cent of your fellow students will
have achieved a better overall grade point average than you at the end
of the current semester?
Note: All questions provide the option to give no answer.
48
Table 12: EFFECT ON CREDITS, BY PRE-TREATMENT EXPECTATIONS – AMONG STUDENTS ELIGIBLE FOR
POSITIVE FEEDBACK)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment 2.700* 1.563 2.110 1.877 1.220
(1.590) (1.686) (1.452) (1.514) (1.183)
Underestimated Performance -2.122 -2.495 -2.670 -3.036*
(2.280) (1.986) (1.919) (1.765)
Treatment*Underestimated 2.542 2.290 2.630 4.061
(3.182) (2.975) (2.751) (2.523)
Treatment+(Treatment*Underestimated) 4.105 4.400* 4.507* 5.281**
(2.769) (2.616) (2.412) (2.374)
N 110 110 110 110 110
Strata FE YES YES YES YES YES
Ability Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Background Variables NO NO NO YES YES
GPA 1st Semester NO NO NO NO YES
Note: See Table 11 for the survey questions on student expectations. Outcome variable: credits 2nd semester; strata FE: credit strata FE,
study program FE, and in the pooled estimations a cohort dummy and its interaction with the study program FE; ability controls: HS
GPA and credits 1st semester; background variables: age, female dummy, time since HS degree, and HS degree Abitur dummy. Robust

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 15: LEE BOUNDS OF THE EFFECT ON CREDITS IN THIRD SEMESTER, BY FEEDBACK TYPE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Negative Ambiguous Positive Positive
Feedback Feedback Feedback, (50,80) Feedback, Top 20%
Experiment I
Lower Bound -1.267 0.148 1.939 -1.104
Treatment Effect -1.196 0.990 2.809 -0.467
Upper Bound -1.068 1.595 3.506 0.656
N 342 165 67 238
Selected N 257 162 63 231
Trimming Proportion 0.0038 0.0337 0.0597 0.0414
Experiment II
Lower Bound 0.178 -1.086 -0.511 -1.928
Treatment Effect 1.607 0.382 0.101 -1.256
Upper Bound 4.007 2.326 1.260 -0.856
N 320 29 202 246
Selected N 202 28 192 239
Trimming Proportion 0.0964 0.0833 0.0449 0.0262
Strata FE NO NO NO NO
Ability Controls NO NO NO NO
Background Variables NO NO NO NO
GPA 1st Semester NO NO NO NO
Note: In the OLS estimates we exclude students that dropped out before the start of the third semester. For the Lee Bounds the group that
suffers less from sample attrition is trimmed – either from below or from above – at the quantile of the outcome variable that corresponds to
the share of excess observations in this group. The lower and upper bound of the treatment effect is calculated from the group differentials
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18: SURVEY QUESTIONS ON ATTENDANCE AND WELL-BEING, 2ND SEMESTER OF EXPERIMENT I
AND II
Question
1 Now we would like to ask you about your overall satisfaction with your
life: How satisfied are you currently with your life, all things consid-
ered?
[0 - completely dissatisfied; 10 - completely satisfied]
2 How frequently did you attend the lectures this semester?
[never; rarely; sometimes; often; very often; always]
3 During the last weeks, how often did you feel stressed out by our stud-
ies?
[never; rarely; sometimes; often; very often; always]
4 Please think about the current semester. To what extent do you agree
with the following statements about your studies: When thinking
about my studies, I think of...
4.1 - not having enough time
4.2 - interesting lectures and curriculum
4.3 - pressure to perform well
4.4 - freedom in organizing my studies
4.5 - competition among students
4.6 - personal development and growth
[0 - completely disagree; 7 - completely agree]
5 Now we would like to ask you about your overall satisfaction with your
studies: How satisfied are you currently with your studies, all things
considered?
[0 - completely dissatisfied; 10 - completely satisfied]
6 More specifically: How satisfied are you so far with your performance
in your studies?
6.1 - With my grades, I am...
6.2 - With my attained credit points (ECTS), I am...
[0 - completely dissatisfied; 10 - completely satisfied]
Estimation Outcomes
For the outcomes in Table 19 we ran exploratory factor analyses to
see if there are variables that load on a common factor. Afterwards
we standardized all survey questions within cohort and study pro-
gram. In the cases where multiple questions captured the same la-
tent construct, we constructed our outcomes by averaging across the
corresponding questions:
Lecture Visits Question 2
Life Satisfaction Question 1
Study
Satisfaction Questions 4.2, 4.6, and 5
Performance
Satisfaction Questions 6.1 and 6.2
Study Stress Questions 3, 4.1, and 4.3
Note: In this table we only include questions on attendance and well-being that were asked in the same way in both experiments. All














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 20: TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRICES – MOVEMENT BETWEEN FEEDBACK TYPES FROM SEC-
OND TO THIRD SEMESTER, POOLED SAMPLE
Treatment Group Feedback Type in 2nd Semester
Negative Ambiguous Positive
Feedback Feedback Feedback
Feedback Type in Dropout 32.31 2.83 2.67
3rd Semester Negative Feedback 62.77 45.28 11.73
Ambiguous Feedback 0.62 3.77 4.53
Positive Feedback 4.31 48.11 81.07
Control Group Feedback Type in 2nd Semester
Negative Ambiguous Positive
Feedback Feedback Feedback
Feedback Type in Dropout 29.08 1.14 4.76
3rd Semester Negative Feedback 63.50 38.64 15.61
Ambiguous Feedback 1.48 3.41 4.23
Positive Feedback 5.93 56.82 75.40
Differential Feedback Type in 2nd Semester
Negative Ambiguous Positive
Feedback Feedback Feedback
Feedback Type in Dropout 3.23 1.69 -2.09
3rd Semester Negative Feedback -0.73 6.64 -3.88
Ambiguous Feedback -0.86 0.36 0.3
Positive Feedback -1.62 -8.71 5.67
Note: The top two panels show the probabilities to receive a certain type of feedback in the third semester conditional on
the type of feedback provided in the second semester for individuals in the treatment group and those eligible to receive a
certain type of feedback in the control group. The bottom panel shows the difference between the transition probabilities of
the treatment and the control group. Due to rounding errors in the top two panels columns may not sum up to 100 and in the





















































































































































































(c) Positive Feedback (50,80)
XXXX
(d) Positive Feedback [80]
XXXX
(e) Positive Feedback (80,100]
XXXX
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Figure 3: FEEDBACK LETTER I – TREATMENT GROUP
Faculty of Business Administration
XXX XXX
XXX XXX







Room: XXX  
07/03/XXXX
XXX





Feedback on your performance in the Bachelor's program International Business
Dear Ms/Mr XXX XXX,
the Department of Business Administration would like to assist you in the further organization and planning of 
your studies. To this end we provide you with feedback information about your current academic performance. 
So far you have earned 19 ECTS-Points (CP) (as of 02/03/XXXX).
In order to allow you a better evaluation of your performance, the following figure compares you to students who 
are similar to you. Like you, they have been enrolled in International Business (Bachelor) at the XXX 













Top 20 %: In the "All Students" group 
20 % earned at least this amount of CP.
All: Average CP of all students in your semester,
who in XXXX earned their school leaving
certificate.
Your CP in comparison to similar students
All similar students on average currently have 5 CP more than you.
Please also keep track of your grades when organizing and planning your studies. Your current grade point 
average is 2.55 (as of: 02/03/XXXX).
We wish you all the best for your studies and hope that you enjoy the time in XXX.
Yours sincerely
Prof. Dr. XXX XXX, Dean
Faculty of Business Administration
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Figure 4: FEEDBACK LETTER I – CONTROL GROUP
Faculty of Business Administration
XXX XXX
XXX XXX















Feedback on your performance in the Bachelor's program International Business
Dear Ms/Mr XXX XXX,
the Department of Business Administration would like to assist you in the further organization and planning of 
your studies. To this end we provide you with feedback information about your current academic performance. 
So far you have earned 23 ECTS-Points (CP), and your current grade point average is 3.43 (as of: 02/03/XXXX).
We wish you all the best for your studies and hope that you enjoy the time in XXX.
Yours sincerely
Prof. Dr. XXX XXX, Dean 
Faculty of Business Administration
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Figure 5: FEEDBACK LETTER II – TREATMENT GROUP
Faculty of Business Administration
XXX XXX
XXX XXX







Room: XXX   
25/05/XXXX
XXX





Your performance in the Bachelor's program International Business
Dear Ms/Mr XXX XXX,
The exam period is coming up soon and once more we would like to help you organize your studies. In order to 
assist you with the planning of this final phase of the semester, we provide you with feedback information about 
your current academic performance again. So far you have earned 24 ECTS-Points (CP) (as of 11/05/XXXX).
In order to allow you a better evaluation of your performance, the following figure compares you to students who 
are similar to you. Like you, they have been enrolled in International Business (Bachelor) at the XXX 
since the WS XXXX/XX.
All
Your CP










Top 20 %: In the "All Students" group 
20 % earned at least this amount of CP.
All: Average CP of all students in your semester,
who before XXXX earned their school leaving
certificate.
Your CP in comparison to similar students
Students in the Top 20 % currently have at least 5 CP more than you.
Please also keep track of your grades when organizing and planning your studies. Your current grade point 
average is 2.36 (as of: 11/05/XXXX).
We wish you all the best for the upcoming exams.
Yours sincerely
Prof. Dr. XXX XXX, Dean 
Faculty of Business Administration
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Figure 6: FEEDBACK LETTER II – CONTROL GROUP
Faculty of Business Administration
XXX XXX
XXX XXX















Your performance in the Bachelor's program International Business
Dear Ms/Mr XXX XXX,
The exam period is coming up soon and once more we would like to help you organize your studies. In order to 
assist you with the planning of this final phase of the semester, we provide you with feedback information about 
your current academic performance again. So far you have earned 14 ECTS-Points (CP), and your current grade 
point average is 1.75 (as of: 11/05/XXXX).
We wish you all the best for the upcoming exams.
Yours sincerely
Prof. Dr. XXX XXX, Dean 
Faculty of Business Administration
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Figure 7: INFO PAGE (LETTER I AND II) – CONTROL AND TREATMENT GROUP
We can advise you on effective learning. Please contact XXX XXX (xxx.xxx@xxx.de) for further information.
The Service Lernen provides further information and interesting programs concerning the broad issue of 
learning at: http://xxx
You can also check out the following links for more information and counseling:
• If you have general questions about your studies at XXX, please contact the zentrale
Studienberatung: http://xxx
• Mentoring by students in the 3rd or higher semesters is provided by the Studienberatungsportal:
http://xxx
• Find the Studienfachberater/in for your specific program of study program at:
http://xxx
• The psychologische Studienberatung provides counseling for personal problems that are rooted in or
related to your studies. Contact Prof. Dr. XXX XXX (xxx.xxx@xxx.de) or Prof. Dr. XXX XXX
(xxx.xxx@xxx.de).
http://xxx
• The Studentenwerk also offers psychological advice. Contact XXX XXX (xxx/xxx):
http://xxx
• You can retrieve the Studienprüfungsordnung for your specific program of study at the department’s web
site: http://xxx
Please note: The information provided in this letter (CP and grades) is not legally binding. Legally 
binding information is only provided by the Prüfungsamt.  
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Standardized Credits Second Semester
Treatment Control
Experiment II: Replication
Note: Second semester credits are standardized within study program and cohort.
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OLS Estimate OLS 95% CI
QR Estimate QR 95% CI
Experiment II: Replication
Note: Outcome variable: credits 2nd semester; control variables as specified in Equation 5. Standard errors of
the simultaneous quantile regressions are bootstrapped using 1000 replications.
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Figure 10: DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUNNING VARIABLE
Combined K-S Test











0 1 2 3 4
















-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80
















-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80















0 1 2 3 4















-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80
















-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80
Distance to Comparison Group's Mean Credits (First Semester)
Control
Experiment II: Replication
Note: The two top panels show the densities of the running variable used for the RDD. Observations with values lower than 1 received
negative, and observations with values above 1 received positive feedback. The four bottom panels show the distribution of the distance
to the comparison group’s median (mean) in credit points. Observations with negative values received negative, and observations with
positive values received positive feedback. Individuals that received ambiguous feedback are excluded in all panels.
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)























Own Credits/Comparison Group's Mean Credits (First Semester)























Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)























Own Credits/Comparison Group's Mean Credits (First Semester)
Control - Experiment II
Note: Binned scatterplots using first order polynomials. Observations on the left side of the cut-off received negative feedback or were
eligible to receive it in case of the control group. Observations on the right side received positive feedback or were eligible to receive it in
case of the control group.
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)










Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)






Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)






Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)
Time since High School Graduation - Control
Note: Binned scatterplots using first order polynomials. Observations on the left side of the cut-off received negative feedback
or were eligible to receive it in case of the control group. Observations on the right side received positive feedback or were
eligible to receive it in case of the control group.
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)







Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)









Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)









Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)
GPA in First Semester - Control
Note: Binned scatterplots using first order polynomials. Observations on the left side of the cut-off received negative feedback
or were eligible to receive it in case of the control group. Observations on the right side received positive feedback or were
eligible to receive it in case of the control group.
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)






Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)






Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)






Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)






Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)
Time since High School Graduation - Control
Note: Binned scatterplots using first order polynomials. Observations on the left side of the cut-off received negative feedback
or were eligible to receive it in case of the control group. Observations on the right side received positive feedback or were
eligible to receive it in case of the control group.
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)
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Own Credits/Comparison Group's Median Credits (First Semester)
GPA in First Semester - Control
Note: Binned scatterplots using first order polynomials. Observations on the left side of the cut-off received negative feedback
or were eligible to receive it in case of the control group. Observations on the right side received positive feedback or were
eligible to receive it in case of the control group.
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Expected Rank
Grade Point Average
Note: Binned scatterplots with equally spaced bins and linear fit. The x-axis reports the expected
rank, normalized between 0 (lowest rank) and 1 (highest rank) among students who enrolled in
the same degree in the second cohort. See Table 11 for the survey questions on students’ expec-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data and Methods Appendix
We use anonymized administrative student-level data on performance at the exam-level, accumu-
lated credit points (ACP) and accumulated grade point average (AGPA) at the time the feedback let-
ters are composed, as well as demographic information. In this section we describe how this data
was used in the feedback letters and the randomization, how outcome variables and covariates are
defined, and how we augment the administrative data with four online surveys.
Feedback Data. We provide feedback on ACP and AGPA in two letters each semester (see Figure 1).
For most students the information in the first and in the second letter was identical but for 133 (21)
cases of Experiment I (II) the university updated the information on ACP during the first treatment
semester.41 These changes occurred if course results were not yet available at the time the first let-
ter was composed, if grades were changed after students inspected their exams, or due to technical
problems at the university.42 As a consequence, a small number of students received different types
of feedback in the two letters. For example, 15 (17) students in Experiment I (II) no longer received
positive feedback in the second letter although they did so in the first letter, and 10 (12) no longer
received negative feedback in the second letter. We define the feedback types based on the content
of the second letter, as its provides the most accurate information and it is more likely to be salient
when students start to prepare for their exams.
The university awards credit points and grades on a module level. Modules can consist of a single
course or of several courses (sub-modules), all of which must be passed to complete the entire mod-
ule. Official module-level grades are based on the credit-weighted grades of the courses which make
up a module. To compute the AGPA the university sums up the product of the grades and credit points
of all modules and divides by the ACP.43 Failing grades (i.e. grade “5”) do not enter into the AGPA. It is
important to note that the university only considers completed modules for the ACP and the AGPA.44
We refer to the university’s approach of accumulating performance measures as aggregation on the
module-level.
Students can access their personal ACP and AGPA online on a website maintained by the uni-
versity. To ensure consistency between the official information students see online and the feed-
back information, we provided the ACP and AGPA in the letters. Although a feedback at the course-
level would more accurately reflect performance (i.e., by including partly completed multiple-course-
modules in the feedback), this was not an option. The reason is that this would have led to conflicting
41Updates during the semester also occur on a similar scale with respect to the AGPA. The changes in the ACP
and AGPA do not necessarily coincide. The reasons for this are explained below.
42 When the first letter of Experiment I was sent the university had not yet calculated the AGPA information
for the study program Business Engineering (N=61).
43For the GPAs in the Business Administration program the university assigns double weights to every module
that is scheduled after the first year.
44 This procedure is in effect across all faculties for the AGPA, but not for the ACP. When calculating the ACP,
the technical faculty also takes sub-modules into account, while the business faculty only counts completed
modules. To give an example, the module Physical Basics of the study program Mechanical Engineering (tech-
nical faculty) consists of the sub-modules Physics (4 CP) and Electrical Engineering (3 CP). If a student only
passes Physics (but not Electrical Engineering) in the first semester the ACP printed in the letter will include an
additional 4 CP, however, her/his AGPA will not contain the Physics grade.
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numbers between the official information on the web and the letters we send.
The university counts zero ACP and a missing AGPA if (i) students did not participate in an exam
yet, (ii) students took exams but did not pass any of these, and (iii) students passed only sub-modules
but did not yet complete a module. For example, at the beginning of the second semester 64 (79)
students had zero ACP in Experiment I (II) and 210 (89) students had a missing AGPA.45 In these
cases, we replaced the AGPA with an asterisk which refers to a footnote stating that “Due to technical
reasons the grade point average is currently not available. Individual grades can be checked on [the
online study platform of the university]".
Randomization Data. In both cohorts, randomization was carried out in the week before the
second semester started using demographic information and individual ACP and AGPA at the time of
randomization.
We stratified on study program and ACP, and performed rerandomization (Morgan and Rubin
2012) based on AGPA, age, sex, high school grade, time since high school graduation, and (in Ex-
periment II) type of high school degree. In Experiment I we defined five ACP strata for every study
program (AC P ≤ 12, 12 < AC P ≤ 18, 18 < AC P ≤ 24, 24 < AC P ≤ 30, AC P > 30) and rerandomized only
in the largest bachelor’s program (Business Administration (BA)). In Experiment II we defined ACP
strata based on quantiles (Q); four ACP strata in the larger study programs BA and Mechanical Engi-
neering (AC P <Q0.25, Q0.25 ≤ AC P <Q0.5, Q0.5 ≤ AC P <Q0.75, AC P ≥Q0.75) and two ACP strata in the
other study programs (AC P <Q0.5, Q0.5 ≤ AC P ). This approach allowed us to rerandomize in all study
programs in Experiment II. For the randomization in Experiment II, we filled missing values on the
variables high school GPA (N=30) and AGPA (N=89) with a constant in order to avoid losing units in
the randomization and to balance on the full sample.46 Tables 4 and 5 shows that missing data on
both variables are balanced across the treatment and the control group.
Outcome Variables and Covariates. For the analysis in Section 4 we used student performance
on the semester-exam-level, i.e. at the course level. We used credit points net of credits granted for in-
ternships, the number of attempted and failed exams (conditional on attempting at least one exam),
dropout, student grades (excluding failing grades), and survey variables on students’ well being as
outcome variables.47 In contrast to ACP and AGPA, the credit points, the number of attempted and
failed exams, and grades are now measured on the course-level, i.e., if students only partly completed
a multiple-course-module we still included the passed and failed sub-modules in our analyzes. Not
only do these outcomes provide more accurate information on the students’ performance in each
45As already stated in footnote 44, cumulative figures are calculated differently across faculties. This results
in unequal numbers of zeros and missing values on the ACP and AGPA variables. Furthermore, the university
had not yet calculated the AGPA information for the study program Business Engineering (N=61) when the
first letter of Experiment I was composed. Thus there are 61 missing values on the AGPA variable for the study
program Business Engineering, which means that there are more missing values on the AGPA variable than
there are zeros on the ACP variable in Experiment I (see footnote 42).
46In Experiment I we balanced only for the study program Business Administration and only for observations
without missing values.
47Internships are scheduled later in the study program (4th/5th semester). Some students are awarded these
credits at the start of their studies because they completed an apprenticeship and have work experience. As we
are interested in the effect of treatment on academic performance, we do not count these internship credits.
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semester, but using the ACP and the AGP as outcome variables could also result in an overstated
treatment coefficient.48
In the regressions we included stratification fixed effects (study program dummies, ACP strata
dummies and a binary variable indicating Experiment I or II for pooled estimations), balancing vari-
ables (age, sex, high school grades,49 and time since high school graduation), and further control
variables (type of HS degree, sub-module-level credits of the first semester) as covariates. To keep
the number of observations constant across specifications we do not include the AGPA at random-
ization (210 (89) missing values in Experiment I (II)) in the vector of balancing variables. Instead,
in the specifications using further control variables we complement the vector of ability controls by
adding the individual GPA on the course-level (= baseline GPA in Equation 5). The course-level GPA
still has missing values for students who attempted no exams or failed all exams they attempted (55
(66) in Experiment I (II) in the overall sample; 1 (0) missing values for individuals who were eligible to
receive positive feedback). We therefore predict the GPA of these students by running linear regres-
sions of the first semester GPA on study program fixed effects, age dummies, gender, time since high
school graduation, type of high school degree, and high school GPA to impute these missing values.
The imputation allows us to keep the sample size comparable across estimations with and without
further control variables.
Survey Data. We also use data from four online surveys. They were conducted in the second half
of the semesters, approximately at the time when we usually sent the second letter (see Figure 1 and
Table 21). Three of the surveys were carried out after the treatment but in Experiment II we also con-
ducted an additional survey prior to the treatment. The questionnaires included questions on out-
come variables such as: how often students attend the lectures, how satisfied they are with their life,
the degree to which they are satisfied with their study program, the degree to which they are satisfied
with their performance, and how stressful they find their studies (see Table 18 for the survey questions
and the variables used in the estimations). We only considered questions as potential outcomes of
interest if they were asked the same way in the surveys of both experiments. Because some questions
cover similar topics and to reduce the number of outcomes we ran exploratory factor analyses to see
which questions load on a common factor. We then standardized all survey questions within cohort
and course of study and in the cases where multiple questions captured the same latent construct, we
constructed our outcomes by averaging across the corresponding questions. Furthermore, in Exper-
iment II we also gathered pre- and post-treatment information on students’ expectations about their
relative performance (Table 11).
48The upward bias occurs when a module consists of several courses which are taken in different semesters.
To calculate the ACP and the AGPA the university records the credits and grades awarded for a module in the
semester in which the last sub-module has been passed. Let’s consider two sub-modules each worth five credits
that constitute a composite module running over the first and second semester. Now compare two otherwise
identical students – one in treatment and in the control group – both have already passed the first sub-module.
If we assume that the feedback causes the treatment student to pass the second exam, the treatment effect in
the cumulative data would be 10 CP. However, the actual performance difference between the two individuals
in the treatment semester is only five credits.
49For some students, the university has no information on high school GPA. We therefore predict 11 (15)
missing values on high school grades in Experiment I (II) from a linear regression of the HS GPA on study
program fixed effects, age dummies, gender, time since high school graduation and type of high school degree.
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Table 21: SURVEY TIME LINE AND PARTICIPATION
Experiment I Experiment II: Replication
Dates Participation Dates Participation
First Semester - - 23/11 - 08/12 20.5%
Second Semester 25/06 - 09/07 31.7% 25/05 - 04/06 15.1%
Third Semester - - 29/11 - 20/12 17.4%
Table 22: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND BALANCING PROPERTIES, STUDENTS WHO WERE ELIGIBLE TO
RECEIVE POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND PARTICIPATED IN 1ST SEMESTER SURVEY, EXPERIMENT II
(1) (2) (3)
Control Group Treatment p-Value
Mean Coefficienta)
(Std. Deviation) (Robust SE)
Age 22.019 -0.230 0.667
(3.196) (0.534)
Female 0.404 -0.015 0.848
(0.495) (0.076)
HS Degree Abitur 0.596 -0.131 0.155
(0.495) (0.092)
Time since HS Degree 1.308 -0.240 0.509
(2.119) (0.362)
HS GPA 2.292 -0.029 0.781
(0.610) (0.103)
% HS GPA Imputedb) 0.000 0.000 .
(0.000) (0.000)
GPA 1st Semester 2.358 -0.013 0.909
(0.608) (0.114)
% GPA 1st Semester Imputedb) 0.000 0.000 .
(0.000) (0.000)
Credits 1st Semester 24.413 1.037 0.299
(7.227) (0.994)
Attempted Exams 1st Semester 5.654 -0.328* 0.098
(1.235) (0.196)
Failed Exams 1st Semester 0.346 -0.125 0.160
(0.789) (0.089)
AGPA at Randomization 2.368 -0.005 0.966
(0.635) (0.120)
% AGPA at Randomization NAb) 0.000 0.000 .
(0.000) (0.000)
N 110
Note: Column (1) presents the unadjusted control group means and standard deviations of the covariates. For details
on the variables see Table 1 and the Data and Methods Appendix. a) Column (2) presents the estimated coefficients
of regressing the covariates on the treatment indicator using Equation 2. Column (3) tests the null hypothesis of no
treatment effect. b) See the Data and Methods Appendix for details on the missing values and the imputation. * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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